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NOTES

THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT:
UNLOCKING THE DOOR TO THE
"KEY EMPLOYEE" EXEMPTION

I.

INTRODUCTION

On February 5, 1993, President Clinton signed the Family and
Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") which was intended "to balance the
demands of the workplace with the needs of families, to promote
the stability and economic security of families, and to promote
national interests in preserving family integrity."' Requiring
employers of approximately half of the nation's workforce to provide leave of absence to employees,2 family and medical leave may
be taken for any of the following reasons:3 (1) the birth of a son or
daughter of the employee4 (2) "the placement of a son or daughter
with the employee for adoption or foster care ' 5 (3) to provide care
for the employee's son, daughter, spouse, or parent who has a serious health condition6 or (4) the serious health condition of the
employee which prevents the employee from working.7 Employers
1. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 7 (1993)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter "FMLA"].

2. See H.R. REP. No. 103-8, at 60 (1993). An employee is eligible for the coverage if he
has been employed for at least 12 months and for at least 1,250 hours during that time. See

29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)(i-ii) (1995). In addition, the FMLA covers any employer engaged in
commerce who employs 50 or more employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i).

3. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (a)(1).
4. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(B).
6. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C).

7. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (a)(1)(D).
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are required to provide health insurance coverage during the
leave. 8
The FMLA requires that an employer restore an employee to his
or her position or to an equivalent position with equivalent benefits, pay and other terms and conditions of employment.9 Section
104 of the statute allows employers, under certain circumstances, to
deny such restoration to certain "key employees" to their prior
positions if they are "among the highest paid [ten] percent" of
employees.' ° Such denial is necessary when the employer believes
that reinstatement will cause "substantial and grievous economic
injury" to his or her operations." Although there has been little, if
any, case law addressing the issue of the "key employee" exemption
since the FMLA's inception, section 104 has been described by
many attorneys as a "nebulous area"'" that is ripe for disagreement
and court interpretation. 3 The application of the "key employee"
exemption will inevitably be litigated and it will therefore be necessary to predict how a court should rule when such cases arise.
This Note will analyze the "key employee" exemption under the
FMLA and highlight the ambiguities and inconsistencies in the statutory language. In addition, the author will demonstrate that the
8. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614 (c)(1).
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614 (a)(1)(A-B). "An equivalent position is one that is virtually
identical to the employee's former position in terms of pay, benefits and working conditions,
including privileges, prerequisites [sic] and status." The Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.215(a) (1995). However, restoration to an equivalent position "does not
extend to . . .intangible, unmeasurable aspects of the job" such as loss of potential
promotional opportunities and an increased likelihood of being subject to a future layoff. See
29 C.F.R. § 825.215(f). The Department of Labor was charged with issuing interim
regulations, Implementation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993; Proposed Rule,
58 Fed. Reg. 13,394 (1993) ("Proposed Rules"), which allowed for a period of comment from
the public. See Family and Medical Leave Act; Interim Final Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,794
(1993). On Jan. 6, 1995, the Department of Labor issued final regulations which are codified
under The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825 (1995) ("Final
Regulations"). While there were some significant changes affecting issues such as
notifications to employers and employees as well as the broadening of certain definitions, the
"key employee" provision was merely given further clarification. See Alice E. Conway, A
Guide To PracticalKnowledge of the FMLA and Its Complex New Final Regulations, 12
CoRP. CouNs. Q. 107, 110 (1995).
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(b)(2).
11. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(b)(1)(A).
12. See Barbara Franklin, Family-Leave Plans: Policies are Rare Among New York
Employers, N.Y.L. J.,
Feb. 11, 1993, at 5, 9.
13. See Don Spatz, Family Leave Act Leaves Executives Confused, READING EAOLE/
READiNG TImsS, Oct. 1, 1993, at B8.
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possible effects of the provision are seemingly inconsistent with the
FMLA's goals of balancing the demands of the workplace with the
economic and social needs of the family.' 4
II.

THm "KEY

EMPLOYEE" EXEMPTION

A "key employee" is defined as a "salaried eligible employee
who is among the highest paid [ten] percent of the employees
15
employed by the employer within 75 miles of the [work] facility."'
While they are entitled to leave and a continuation of their health
benefits during that time,' 6 the employer may refuse to reinstate a
"key employee" to his or her prior position under certain circumstances.' 7 If reinstating the employee would cause "substantial and
grievous economic injury to the operations of the employer," then
the employer is permitted to deny the employee restoration to the
prior position.'"
The legislative history illustrates the rationale behind the exemption. While "[t]he essential purpose of the [FMLA] [was] to provide employees the security that comes from the knowledge that
leave will be available if a family emergency arises,"' 9 Congress did
not want to completely overlook the daily operations of the
employer. It realized that "in very critical, limited circumstances[,]
...the employee in question is crucial to the ongoing operation of
the employer."2 0 Because this employee is "essential," it is pre14. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 7 (1993).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(b)(2). "A 'key employee' must be 'among the highest 10 percent'
of all the employees-both salaried and non-salaried ... ." The Family and Medical Leave
Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.217(c) (1995).
In determining which employees are among the highest paid 10 percent, year-todate earnings are divided by weeks worked by the employee (including weeks in
which paid leave was taken). Earnings include wages, premium pay, incentive pay,
and non-discretionary and discretionary bonuses. Earnings do not include
incentives whose value is determined at some future date, e.g., stock options, or
benefits or perquisites [sic].
29 C.F.R. § 825.217(c)(1). "The determination of whether a salaried employee is among the
highest paid 10 percent shall be made at the time the employee gives notice of the need for
leave. No more than 10 percent of the employer's employees within 75 miles of the worksite
may be 'key employees."' 29 C.F.R. § 825.217(c)(2).

16. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(c)(1).
17. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(b).
18. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(b)(1)(A).
19. 139 CONG. REc. 11396, 437 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep. Ford).

20. See id. at 436.
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sumed that he is receiving "top salary."'" In this situation, the
employer should be able to deny reinstatement to the high-paid
individual. The "key employee" exemption takes this employer
concern into account.
Once the employee notifies the employer of the need to take
leave, the employer is obligated to give written notice to the
employee that he or she qualifies as a "key employee."2 In addition, "the employer must also fully inform the employee of the
potential consequences with respect to reinstatement and maintenance of health benefits if the employer should determine that substantial and grievous economic injury to . . . [its] operations will

result... [upon reinstatement]." ' If the employer has not determined whether the employee in question is a "key employee" and
cannot notify the employee of his or her status immediately, it must
be given in a reasonable time after being notified of the need for
leave or the commencement of the leave. 24 However, an
employer's failure to notify in a timely manner will result in the loss
of the right to deny restoration regardless of whether substantial
and grievous economic injury will occur?2
Upon a good faith determination that "substantial and grievous
economic injury" to its operations will result if the "key employee"
who has given notice of the need for leave is reinstated, the
employer is required to notify the employee in writing of its intention to deny reinstatement at the end of the leave.26 The notice
21. See id.at 437.

22. See The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.219(a) (1995).
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.219(b). The regulation assumes that an employer will be able to
give notice of the intention to deny restoration prior to the employee starting leave. See id.
"The employer must serve this notice either in person or by certified mail." Id. The required
notice, Form WH-381, titled: Employer Response to Employee Request for Family and
Medical Leave, states in part:

7(a). You [ ] are [ ] are not a "key employee" as described in § 825.218 of the
FMLA regulations. If you are a "key employee," restoration to employment may
be denied following FMLA leave on the grounds that such restoration will cause
substantial and grievous economic injury to us.

(b) We [ ] have [ ] have not determined that restoring you to employment at the
conclusion of FMLA leave will cause substantial and grievous economic harm to us.
John A. Ricca, Disability Leave Alphabet Soup: ADA, FMLA, CFRA and WC, in 24TH
ANNUAL INSTrrUE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW, at 745, 822 app. (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 527, 1995).
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must give reasons why substantial and economic injury will result,
and must provide the employee a reasonable time to return to work
(assuming leave has commenced) while taking into account the surrounding circumstances, such as the duration of the leave and
necessity of the employee returning to work.27 If the employee on
leave does not return to work after receiving notification of the
employer's intent to deny restoration, the employee is still entitled
to health benefits and rights as a "key employee."2 Unless the
employee informs the employer that he or she no longer wishes to
return to work or the leave period ends, the employee's rights are
still protected under the FMLA.2 9

Even though the employer has sufficiently given notice to the
employee that economic harm will result upon reinstatement, the
employee can still request reinstatement at the end of the leave
period despite the fact that the employee did not return to work
after receiving notice of the employer's intentions.3 ° The employer
is then required to once again "determine whether there will be
substantial and grievous economic injury from reinstatement, based
on the facts at that time."31 If harm will result at that time, the
then notify the employee of the "denial of
employer must
'32
restoration.
III.

AMBIGUITIES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN THE

"KEY

EMPLOYEE" EXEMPTION

Similar to other sections of the Family and Medical Leave Act,
the "key employee" provision uses vague and ambiguous language.33 Moreover, the legislative history provides little guidance
in defining and interpreting the different factors of the exemption.

27. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.219(b).
28. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.219(c).
29. See id.
30. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.219(d).
31. Id.
32. See id.

33. See Carol Ann Humiston, Emerging Issues Under the Family and MedicalLeave Act,
43 FED. LAW. 35 (1996) (describing compliance with the FMLA as "a huge government ball

of red tape").
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A.

Substantial and Grievous Economic Injury

While the Department of Labor states certain factors when considering "substantial and grievous economic injury," "[a] precise
test cannot be set for the level of hardship or injury to the employer
which must be sustained." 4 The regulations merely provide what
would generally be considered sufficient to deny reinstatement. For
example, the reinstatement of a "key employee" that would
threaten the economic viability of the firm would be considered
"substantial and grievous economic injury."35 In addition, "[a]
lesser injury which causes substantial, long-term economic injury
would also be sufficient." 6 However, "[m]inor inconveniences and
costs that the employer would experience in the normal course of
doing business would certainly not constitute 'substantial and grievous economic injury.""'

In addition to an imprecise standard for the requisite level of
injury needed, the legislative history gives differing views as to how
the standard should be applied. "In addressing this provision, the
Department [of Labor] considered two alternative interpretations:
(1) That the employee's taking leave must cause substantial and
grievous economic injury to the operations of the employer; and (2)
that the employee's restoration to employment after taking leave
must cause the substantial and grievous economic injury."3 " Based
on the plain meaning of the statutory language, it must be the restoration of the employee to employment, not whether the absence of
the employee will cause "substantial and grievous injury.139 In
making this determination, the employer:
[m]ay take into account its ability to replace on a temporary basis
(or temporarily do without) the employee on FMLA leave. If
permanent replacement is unavoidable, the cost of then reinstating the employee can be considered in evaluating whether substantial and grievous economic injury will occur from restoration;
34. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.218(c).

35. See id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993; Interim Final Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,794,
31,805 (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.218(a)) (proposed June 4, 1993).
39. See Jane Rigler, Analysis and Understandingof the Family and MedicalLeave Act of
1993, 45 CASE W. Ras. L. REv. 457, 466 (1995) (citing 58 Fed. Reg. at 31,805).
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in other words, the effect on the operations of the company of
reinstating the employee in an equivalent position."n
Contrary to this, the legislative history reveals inconsistencies on
this factor.4 ' For example, the House and Senate Reports state,
"[i]n measuring grievous economic harm, a factor to be considered
is the cost of losing a key employee if the employee chooses to take
the leave, notwithstanding the determination that restoration will
be denied." 2 This would indicate that the cost of the absence on
the employer is also a consideration in denying reinstatement.
Interestingly, the minority in the committee report and on the floor
indicates much confusion as to whether the exemption should take
into account the effect of reinstatement or the effect of the leave or
both.4 3 In comments to the floor, Rep. Bill Goodling stated:
Note that the focus, strangely, is not on the impact of the
employee's absence, but on the reinstatement... Maybe if he or
she was making $500,000 a year, reinstatement might lead to
grievous harm but when else?
I realize this is strange language that is in this bill, and it may
have been structured this way in order to require the employer to
continue to pay health insurance benefits for the employee, but
that fact does not cbange the bill's focus on the effect of reinstatement. The Members may also have noticed that the language does not allow for any consideration of any factors other
than economic, such as safety and health. What about the safety
of the workplace? 44
Yet comments by Rep. Roukema, a driving force behind the bill,
indicate differently:
An employer may deny reinstatement to avoid serious economic
harm from an employee's being out on leave. In addition, the
substitute retains the key employee exemption, where the top
employees may be denied reinstatement if their absence would
cause substantial and grievous harm to an employer's operations.
This provision is designed to ensure that employers do not expe40. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.218(b) (1995).

41.
42.
43.
44.
58 Fed.

See 58 Fed. Reg. at 31,805; Rigler, supra note 39, at 466 n.55.
58 Fed. Reg. at 31,805.
See 58 Fed. Reg. at 31,805; Rigler, supra note 39, at 466 n.55.
139 CONG. Rc. H396, 436 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep. Goodling); see
Reg. at 31,805.
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Pence financial difficulties when highly specialized or compen45
sated essential workers request family or medical leave.
Congresswoman Roukema's statements indicate that the legislative intent behind the exemption is more concerned with the time
period during which the employee is taking the leave and its effect
on the employer, rather than the effect of restoration on the
employer. This approach is further supported by the requirement
that if the FMLA leave has commenced, the employer must provide
the employee a reasonable time in which to return to work while
taking into account factors "such as the length of the leave and the
urgency of the need for the employee to return."46 This would
imply that it is the employee's leave, not the restoration, which is
causing the injury. 7 Nevertheless, "[b]ased on the language of the
Act itself and the overall sense of the legislative history, ' 48 the
Department of Labor interpreted this section of the statute to
require the employer to show that it is the restoration to employment that causes the injury in order to deny reinstatement to a "key
employee." 49 To support its reasoning, the Department described a
situation in which an employer hires a permanent replacement
while the "key employee" is on leave. 0 If restoring the "key
employee" to the same position could cause "substantial and grievous economic injury" to the company, then the employer can deny
restoration to the employee." While the Department supported
this approach, its later statements leave this interpretation open to
45. 58 Fed. Reg. at 31,805. Congresswoman Roukema contradicts her own statement in
an earlier debate in which she provides a hypothetical which signifies that the reinstatement,
not the leave, is the proper consideration in determining substantial and grievous economic
injury:
A highly compensated engineer at an architectural firm needs medical leave as a
result of having a heart attack. However, at the time the engineer is taken ill, she is
working on an important project that means a tremendous fee to the firm and any
cessation of work on this project may result in the business losing its contract. The
employer in this instance may allow the employee to go out on leave, but will not
keep the job open for her return at the end of the leave period. Instead, the
employer will hire another engineer to continue the work.
137 CONG. RtEc. H9722, 9727 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1991) (statement of Rep. Roukema).

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.219(b) (1995).
See Rigier, supra note 39, at 466 n.55.
See 58 Fed. Reg. at 31,805.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 31,806.
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controversy and possibly further clarification by Congress in the
52
future.
B. Notice
With respect to notice requirements, the FMLA requires that the
employer make a "good faith determination, based on the facts
available that substantial and grievous economic injury" will occur
and that notice be provided to the employee. 3 "Although it is possible that an employer might anticipate grievous injury in any circumstance in which a key employee departs for more than a given
period, the requirement of contemporaneous notice indicates that
Congress likely intended the exemption.., to be applied on a caseby-case basis."'54 Thus, employers are given a tremendous amount
of discretion when assessing the potential injury that may result.
With respect to the good faith requirement, the lack of objectivity
may give employers too much discretion in making a determination
of economic harm. Moreover, what may be considered substantial
economic harm to one employer may not be for another. Despite
these differences, the legislative history indicates that it may be possible to establish some form of guidelines for employers to consider. 6 For instance, in the Proposed Rules issued prior to the
Act's inception, the Department of Labor considered whether standards should be drafted to implement the exemption or whether the
employer's reasonable belief is sufficient.5 7

With respect to timely notice, the Rules ask whether an employer
should be obligated to give advanced notice of a worker's "key
employee" status to which reinstatement could then be denied.58
This question implies that the employer has the ability to make such
a determination in advance.5 9 But in order to justify the exemption,
52. See id.("While this interpretation is the more supportable, the Department
recognizes that such a test will be extremely difficult to meet.").
53. See The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.219(b) (1995).

54. J.W. Waks & C.R. Brewster, Family Leave Coverage is Overestimated, NAT'L LJ.,
May 3,1993, at 27 (1993).

55. See id. at 28 n.8.
56. See Implementation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993; Proposed Rule,
58 Fed. Reg. 13,394, 13,398 (1993) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825 (1995) (proposed Mar. 10,

1993).
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.219(b); Waks &
Brewster, supra note 54, at 27.
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the employer is also required to show that the company would sustain substantial and grievous economic injury if restoration was
granted.60 According to the FMLA, this determination is supposed
to be made contemporaneously with the request for leave.6 1 From
the employer's standpoint, however, contemporaneous notice may
not only be difficult, but almost impossible to assess.62 For instance,
"[a] highly paid employee's restoration in one year might cause no
such injury; [however] in a subsequent year, the same employee
might be denied restoration if leave was taken, the employer
replaced her and restoration would cause 'substantial and grievous
economic injury' to the employer."63 This may be especially true of
start-up companies whose revenues may fluctuate greatly at first
but level out over time. Given the inability to make such a determination, requiring notification would put an undue burden on the
employer to provide information of which he may not be aware. 64
Another aspect of the notice requirement that will likely raise
some controversy is the time in which the leave has already commenced and the employer notifies the employee that his reinstatement will cause the requisite injury. Under the Final Regulations,
the employee then has the option to elect not to take the leave at all
or return from the leave.65 However, there is no mention of how
long the employee has to decide what he or she is going to do once
the employer makes this determination.66 The regulation only
focuses on the employer, stating that he or she must give the
60. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.218(a). "[O]ne of the major points of misunderstanding about
FMLA is that employers think that because a person on leave earns one of the highest
salaries at the company she can automatically be replaced." Paul Bomberger, Leave Gives
Business Empty Feeling:New Legislation Could Create as Many Problems as it Solves, Some
Say, INTELLIGENCER J., Aug. 2, 1993, at 1. The employer must also "demonstrate severe
economic injury." See id.
61. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.219(a); Waks & Brewster, supra note 54, at 27.
62. See Rigler, supra note 39, at 467.
63. See Rigler, supra note 39, at 467.
64. See Family Leave Could Spark Litigation, 143 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 496, 497
(1993) (predicting that many employers will fail to give the required notice which will
generate lawsuits and it will be difficult for employers to prove grievous injury at the time the
employee requests return to work). The exception also requires the employer to offer a
reasonable opportunity to return to work from the leave after giving the key employee
notice. See § 825.219(b) (1995). This may also raise questions as to what is a "reasonable"
time to allow the employee to return to work after notice. See Family Leave Could Spark
Litigation, 143 LAB. REL REP. (BNA) at 497.
65. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.219(b).
66. See Family Leave: It's Now The Law, 8 TENN. EMp. L. UPDATE 1, 4 (1993).
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employee a reasonable time to return.6 7 This is a subjective stan-

dard that can only be decided on a case-by-case basis.68 From the
employee's standpoint, a reasonable time might be construed as a
month or more. However, "[flor many small businesses, the loss of
a key employee for an extended period would result in significant
hardship ....*,69 If such a time period were forced upon the
employer, this would defeat the purpose of the "key employee"
designation.
IV. EFFECTS OF

THE EXEMPTION ON THE EMPLOYER
AND EMPLOYEE

A.

The Top Ten Percent

Under the exemption, only those salaried employees in the top
ten percent can be considered eligible for denial of restoration.70
By applying a numerical distinction without considering other factors related to the workplace, the ten percent provision may seem
unfair to certain employees.71 For instance, "[i]nsignificant differences in [employee's salaries] might cause significant differences in
FMLA protections. '72 In addition, "[c]hanges in the employer's
payroll might cause an individual to be in the top ten percent one
year, but not the next. ' 73 By referring only to salaried employees,
the FMLA and the legislative history make no mention of those
occupations in which an employee's salary is composed of salary as
67. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.219 (b).
68. Robert G. Brody & Margaret R. Bryant, The FMLA In Real Life, SMALL Bus. REP.,
Apr. 1994, at 49, 52.
69. Id. The article gives the example of a vice president of operations of a company
informing his or her employer that she will need leave both before and after the birth of her
child due to medical complications. Assuming the employer has designated her as a key
employee, the employer will not be required to reinstate her. See id.
70. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.217(a). The exemption has been described by some as the "Big
Banana" exception, in reference to very highly compensated employees. See Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993 Becomes Law: Much Ado About Very Little- PartII, 4 TEX. EMP.
LE'rER 1 (1993) (LEXIS, News, Arcnws Library, Texas Employment Law Letter & Apr.
1993).
71. See Jane Rigler, Analysis and Understandingof the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993, 45 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 457, 467 (1995).
72. Id. The author uses the example of an employee who earns merely 10 dollars more
annually than another employee will face a drastically different decision to make regarding
paid leave if the higher paid employee happened to fall in the top 10%. See id.
73. Id.
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well as commission.7 "What about a highly compensated individual who receives no salary but a whopping income in commissions?
The Act's literal language precludes any assertion that such an
employee may be denied the full range of FMLA benefits."'7 5
More importantly, applying the exemption only to those employees in the top-ten percent of the payment scale under-serves both
the employer and employee. Specifically, the exemption "protects
low- and mid-level workers, but leaves top employees vulnerable."76 It unjustifiably assumes that employees in the "highest-paid
echelons of a company are the only valuable ones. 7 7 In fact, in
many companies the opposite is true.78 The most important
employees to the existence of a company are not in the top ten
percent of paid employees. 79 While a top executive or CEO is typically the "brains" behind the company's management, in many
companies the top ten percent salaried employees are possibly the
least missed because "their work tends to be more oriented toward
paperwork rather than hands-on production ....
"80
In assessing an employee strictly on his or her economic value,
the exemption does not consider other aspects of employee importance to an employer. For example, an employer could not deny
leave to an employee who played an important part in completing a
project with a very tight deadline.81 In addition, he or she would
have no power to deny reinstatement to an employee who was
privy to confidential information or "was simply irreplaceable on
short notice because of his or her specialized expertise."8
74. See id.While the statutory language is silent as to commissions, one can argue that a
factor such as "incentive pay," which the regulations provide to determine which employees
are among the highest paid ten percent, would include commissions. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.217(c)(1). Moreover, the regulations also provide that the key employee "must be
'among the highest paid 10 percent' of all the employees-both salaried and non-salaried."
29 C.F.R. § 825.217(c). This can also be construed as to include commission pay.
75. Id. See also Family Leave Could Spark Litigation, supra note 64, at 497 (questioning
whether an employee earning only $10,000 in salary but commissions of $250,000 would
qualify under the exemption).
76. John Stancavage, Family and Medical Leave Act Draws Cheers, Criticism, TULSA
WORLD, Aug. 1, 1993, at G1.

77. See 139 CONG. REc. H396, 436 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Goodling).
78. See id.

79.
80.
81.
82.

See id.
See id. at 437.
See id.
See id.
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The inability to deny leave to important employees other than
those that are highly paid can create more than just financial loss to
the employer. In occupational fields such as health care, managers
might encounter situations in which granting an employee's leave
cause the employer financial as well as operational
request may
83
hardships.
For example, if a managerial employee takes an extended leave,
a health care firm may need to temporarily move a manager from
another department-or perhaps even another location-to
cover the position. This may cause both the efficiency of operations and the level of patient care to suffer while concomitantly
84
causing the total employment costs of the employer to rise.
Indeed, the exemption "does not even allow consideration of
severe economic factors unless the employee is in the top [ten] percent and does not even recognize safety and health factors. [It]
focuses simply on economic factors."85
Another questionable aspect of the exemption is that it applies
only to the highest paid ten percent employees of a company within
a seventy-five mile radius of that worksite.86 As is the case with
many large publicly held companies, "[a]n employee may be among
the most highly compensated employees at a remote facility and
thereby subject to the exemption, even if the employee is not
among the highest-paid [ten] percent of employees in the company.",87 With respect to a specific employer, "an employer with
operations in widely dispersed areas could have different high-paid
groups in each location. '88 It is questionable whether Congress
83. David C. Wyld, Hippocrates Takes a Blow: The Family and Medical Leave Act and

Health Care Administration, 14 HEALTH CARE SUPERVISOR 63, 67 (1995). This concern is
also expressed in the legislative history in which Rep. Goodling describes an employer who is
short-staffed in a safety and health department but cannot deny leave to a crucial employee.
The effect would be to endanger the lives of patients or implore others to work overtime in
critical safety areas under increased fatigue and higher likelihood of carelessness. See 139
CONG. Rac. H396, 437 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep. Goodling).
84. Wyld, supra note 83, at 67. Some of the costs that are described involve the use of
one important employee to cover the leave of a key employee which will lead to other
employee moves as well as the associated operational and financial costs. See Wyld, supra
note 83, at 67.
85. 139 CONG. REc. at 437 (statement of Rep. Goodling).
86. See The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.217(a) (1995).
87. J.W. Waks & C.R. Brewster, Family Leave Coverage is Overestimated, NAT'L L.J.,
May 3, 1993, at 20.
88. Seth H. Tievsky, Unraveling Family Leave Law Time, Regulation Needed to Clarify
New Law's Impact on Employers, Bus. INs., Mar. 15, 1993, at 19, 20. "Warehouse managers
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intended the exemption to reach this class of employees. Whether
or not an employee works at a company's headquarters, where "the
10 [percent] threshold would likely cover a much higher-paid
group" or "at a manufacturing plant 100 miles away", would greatly
impact an employee's coverage. 89 Thus, the exemption lacks uniformity not only across different companies, but within the individual company as well.
In many companies, the highest paid individuals are CEOs or
high ranking officers who may spend very little time at one worksite
and visit multiple locations on a regular basis. Should this
employee be exempt from FMLA protection and if so, at which
worksite should he or she be counted toward? Neither the statute
nor the regulations address this type of situation.
B. Substantial and Grievous Economic Injury
In determining "substantial and grievous economic injury," Congress has created a subjective standard in which the harm is evaluated on a case-by-case basis. This is evident in the report by the
House Committee on Education and Labor, which noted that, "[i]n
measuring grievous economic harm, a factor to be considered is the
cost of losing a key employee if the employee chooses to take the
leave, notwithstanding the determination that restoration will be
denied." 90 This discretion given to employers, however, "appears
to be an invitation to litigation." 91 For example, the Proposed
Rules ask whether an employer's reasonable belief of possible serious economic injury is sufficient to warrant denial of restoration.92
Assuming the employer reasonably believes that serious economic
injury will occur, but circumstances actually turn out differently,
should the employer be obligated to reinstate the former
or regional sales representatives, for example, could be denied restoration of employment
and benefits, even if their compensation falls in the middle of overall employee salaries."
Waks & Brewster, supra note 87.

89. See Tievsky, supra note 88, at 20.
90. H.R. REP. No. 8, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., pt.1, at 42 (1993).
91. Waks & Brewster, supranote 87, at 27; See Mary Helen Gillespie, Editorial, Family
Leave Law No Cure-all BosToN HERALD, Aug. 5, 1993, at 29 (referring to the key
exemption as the "Lawsuits R Us" clause).

92. See Implementation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993; Proposed Rule,
58 Fed. Reg. 13,394, 13,398 (1993) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825 (1995) (proposed Mar. 10,
1993).
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employee? 93 Once the requisite harm is shown, how long must it
last? "It is unclear whether... [it] must be permanent, temporary,
or exist for a particular amount of time before it will be found sufficiently 'substantial.' ' '94 The Rules also question the employer's
obligations once the employee's position has been filled by a
replacement, due to the threat of economic harm, where there is an
equivalent position available.9" "Must the employee be restored to
the equivalent position?" 9 6 These and other questions are left

unanswered in the final regulations. Without guidelines regarding
such important decisions, employers will have to rely on "ad hoc
judgments" when granting leave, exposing themselves to the constant threat of litigation.97 As a result, "[e]mployers surely will find
themselves the target of lawsuits if they freely grant leave to new
mothers but not to new fathers, or if their policies are perceived to
be tougher on black employees than on white employees."98
The use of discretion in determining designation of "key employees" not only subjects the employer to possible litigation, but could
hurt morale among the most highly paid employees. 99 An
employee who knows he will be denied reinstatement if he is to
take FMLA leave will undoubtedly feel resentment toward the
employer. 100 Thus, applying an unannounced policy not only puts
the employer on the defensive, but creates a sense of ill-will among
employees. 01'
The same may be true of the requirement that the employer
prove economic injury. As mentioned in the Final Regulations, a
"precise test" does not exist to establish the requisite level of injury
to the employer.10 2 It merely states that the standard is different
from and more strict than the "undue hardship" test under the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") because the former
includes "substantial long-term injury" while the latter involves
93. See id.
94. Amy Olsen, Comment, Family Leave Legislation: Ensuring Both Job Security and
Family Values, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 983, 1019 (1995).

95. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 13,398 (1993).
96. Id.
97. See Waks & Brewster, supra note 87, at 27.

98. Waks & Brewster, supra note 87, at 27.
99. See Laura Ruane, Details of Family Leave Act, G&rna-r NEws SERV., Aug. 2, 1993,

available in 1993 WL 7317968.
100. See Waks & Brewster, supra note 87, at 27.
101. See Waks & Brewster, supra note 87, at 27.
102. See The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.218(c) (1995).
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"significant difficulty or expense."' 3 Similar to the key employee
exemption, however, the undue hardship test also takes into
account the economic effect on the employer, by considering "[t]he
impact of the accommodation upon the operation of the facility,
including the impact on the ability of other employees to perform
their duties and the impact on the facility's ability to conduct
business. "104

Not only are "substantial" and "grievous" open to varied interpretation, but it may be impossible for an employer to assess the
amount of injury that may be caused by an employee's return to
work. 105 For instance, a significant drop in the value of a company's
stock might be considered "substantial and grievous economic
injury" to some employers but merely a "predictable setback" to
others.0 6
Because economic harm focuses only on the effect and does not
even consider the cause of the injury, the standard does not hold
the company responsible for its own actions. For example, it would
seem unfair to deny reinstatement to a highly compensated
employee who takes family leave as a result of "negligent mismanagement decisions."' 1 7 By not taking into account the productivity
of an employee, nor considering changing economic cycles within a
particular company, the requisite standard of injury does not balance family needs with those of the workplace.
When considering the grievous injury test, it is important to
remember that the FMLA itself only applies to companies of fifty
103. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.218(d); see also Regulations to Implement the Equal
Employment Provisions of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (p)(1)
(1995) (defining the term "undo hardship").
104. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(v). Some other factors also considered in determining
whether an accommodation would impose undue hardship are
(i) The nature and net cost of the accommodation needed ... ; (ii) The overall

financial resources of the facility or facilities involved ... the number of persons
employed.. . and the effect on expenses and resources; (iii) The overall financial
resources of the covered entity, the overall size of the business of the covered

entity... ; (iv) The type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including
the composition, structure and functions of the workforce [involved] ....
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(i), (ii), (iii), (iv).

105. See Olsen, supra note 94.
106. See Olsen, supra note 94.
107. See Olsen, supra note 94. This might include decisions such as discontinuing a
particular product or restructuring of the corporate entity.
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employees or more. 08 By requiring substantial and grievous harm,
the test is a "very high hurdle for a business [because] [i]t [will] be
extremely difficult for larger employers to prove that the return of a
highly paid employee would have a negative impact on a business
[employing fifty or more people]."'10 9 Further, one can argue that
the larger the company is, or the more people it employs, the less
likely it will be that one high-paid individual's reinstatement will
adversely affect the company. 1 0 Under this reasoning, some have
even questioned why the exception was placed in the FMLA at
all."' In fact, when combined with the Final Regulations, some
attorneys feel that notification becomes "so onerous, that it will be
almost impossible to qualify for the exemption." 1 2 Ultimately,
"[t]he issue likely will be settled only in the courts, which would
force employers to ask how aggressively they want to pursue3 the
exception - both a time-consuming and expensive process.""1
Another effect of the exemption is to create instability for
existing workers." 4 For instance, two employees in similar positions taking FMLA leave at the same time might not have the same
level of job security."'
The employer might seek replacements for both employees but
be able to put only one replacement on the payroll by the time
both leaves end. Restoring one employee plus continuing the
employment of the replacement might not lead to 'substantial
108. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A) (1995).
109. Karen Levine, Ambiguities Cited in New Family Leave Act; Employers Must Review
Policies, Lawyers Say, MAss. LAW. W LY., Apr. 5, 1993, at 25.

110. For example, it seems extremely unlikely that the reinstatement of an executive
earning a six-digit income at a Fortune 500 company would significantly impact the
company's earnings, even at a satellite office.
111. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 Becomes Law: Much Ado About Very

Little- Part 11, 4 TEx. EMP. LETTER 1 (1993).
112. Ruane, supra note 99; see also Rick Desloge, Leave Act Could Leave Some Workers
Out: May Not Cover Highest-Paid Employees, ST. Louis Bus. J., June 28, 1993 at 5B ("It's

going to be tough for the employer to make the argument in all but the most obvious cases");
Stephen Alfred, An Overview of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 24 PuB.
PERSONNEL

MoaMr. 67, 70 (1995) ("As a practical matter, few public employers are likely to

be able to meet this stringent standard").

113. Desloge, supra note 112, at 5B.
114. See Jane Rigler, Analysis and Understandingof the Family and Medical Leave Act of

1993, 45 CAsB W. L. Rlv. 457, 467 (1995).
115. See id.
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and grievous economic injury,' but restoring
two employees and
116

maintaining the replacement might.

In using this standard, it seems unfair to allow the employer to
deny restoration to one of the employees simply due to financial
circumstances." 7
The economic impact of leave on the employee could seriously
affect a family's planning of care for a child or elderly parent."" An
employee will not know whether or not he falls within the top ten
percent of paid workers or whether or not the employer will replace
him if he were to take leave." 9 Consequently, the employee will be
forced to seek information about the employer's finances in considering whether or not his return would cause economic harm. 20 The
employer may not appreciate disclosing this traditionally confidential information. By consulting the employer with respect to his
payroll status, the employee will be forced to disclose 121
private matters such as possible pregnancy, family care or illness.
Another party that may be affected by the establishment of economic injury is the replacement worker. "The employer might
assume that any benefit gained by permanently replacing a temporarily absent employee will be outweighed by the litigation risks
associated with the employer's obligation to establish 'substantial
and grievous economic injury' to justify the replacement.' 1 22 Thus,
an opportunity to hire a possible replacement will be forgone. In
addition, the "key employees" may be so concerned with the possibility that they may be denied their job upon return from leave, that
they may decide not to take advantage of their entitlements at all
regardless of whether it results in damage to the employer. 2 3 This
may ultimately translate into fewer "rank-and-fie" employees exer116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
See id.
See id. at 468.
See id.
See Rigler, supra note 114 at 468.
See Rigler, supra note 114 at 468.
Rigler, supra note 114 at 468; see Nancy R. Daspit, The Family and Medical Leave

Act of 1993: A Great Idea But a "Rube Goldberg" Solution?, 43 EMORY LJ. 1351, 1396

(1994) ("Without more information, employers may be afraid to exercise this option even if
they are justified in denying reinstatement to a key employee."); FMLA Regulations-PartIII,

2 Wis. EMPL. LTR. 1 (1993) (LEXIS, News, Arcnws Library, Wisconsin Employment Law
Letter & Sept 1993) (arguing that "the risk involved in denying restoration to a key employee
will most likely outweigh any potential benefit to the company").
123. See Rigler, supra note 114, at 468 n.60.
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cising their FMLA rights,'2 4 as "[t]hose employees may see the

supervisor's reluctance to take FMLA
leave as a subtle message
'
that they should behave similarly.' 12
C. The Affect on Women and Older Employees
Although the FMLA offers both men and women the right to
take unpaid leave, one of its aims is to close the gender gap that
continues to exist in the workplace. 26 Critics of the "key
employee" provision, however, argue that it promotes gender inequalities, having a dual effect on the careers of working women. 127
First of all, women who are in this pay range will be forced to
choose between family and job security, which will further stunt
female advancement up the corporate ladder. Second, career
wives whose husbands are in the top ten percent of their company's pay scale will be the spouses to take leave because of the
unwillingness to jeopardize
the job security of their highly com28
pensated husbands.'
The "key employee" exemption forces women to decide between
work and family, a problem that the FMLA was enacted to solve. 29
Historically, women have struggled to achieve the highest pay
scales and currently there are many less women than men in the
highest paid positions within most companies.130 By forcing this
limited group of women to choose between work and family, the
exemption inevitably will "perpetuate gender inequality in the
31
workplace."'
Women in the top ten percent pay scale will be affected more
than men in the same pay range because the burden of tending to
124.
125.
126.
127.

See Rigler, supra note 114, at 468 n.60.
Rigler, supra note 114, at 468.
See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(5) (1995).
See Amy Olsen, Comment, Family Leave Legislation: Ensuring Both Job Security

and Family Values, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 983, 1015 (1995).
128. Id.
129. See Robert M. Cassel, The Federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 and
California'sFamily Rights Act of 1991, CEB CAL. Bus. L. REP., July 1993, at 29 (1993).
130. See Deborah L. Rhode, Occupational Inequality, 88 DuKE L.J. 1207, 1210 (1988)
("For example, in the late 1980s, females were still only half as likely as males to be partners
in law firms, held only eight percent of state and federal judgeships, and occupied only two
percent of corporate executive positions in Fortune 500 companies.").
131. Olsen, supra note 127, at 1016.
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the family falls primarily on women. 2 Specifically, "[b]ecause
women exclusively bear the burden of childbearing and predominantly play the main role in childbearing, this exception disproportionately forces women approaching top management positions to
choose between their careers and family responsibilities.' ' 3 While
highly paid women have achieved economic success, they no longer
have the job guarantee they would have had if they had taken leave
as a lower paid employee. 3 Consequently, the female employee
must now make a decision between her family and her job.135 In
effect, this creates a disincentive for females in the workplace to
have children.
As a result of the exemption, a woman's higher salary may be
completely offset by the lack of job security. She may not know
whether or not she presently is, or will be in the top ten percent of
paid employees in the future. 136 "Therefore, a woman who wants
to start a family may hesitate to pursue the 'fast track' up the corporate ladder if she will lose her ability to take FMLA leave."'3 7 This
insecurity may ultimately have the effect of slowing down female
advancement in general. Indeed, "the problem of reconciling work
with parenting is a woman's greatest problem with respect to eliminating discrimination."'133 Instead of protecting the interests of
those most affected by FMLA leave, women are the victims of the
exemption because "[t]hey work hard to break
the 'glass ceiling'
1 39
it."'
for
penalized
are
they
do
they
and when
132. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5) (1995); see also Rhode, supra note 130, at 1216
("Subordinate occupational status has encouraged women to make lower career investments
and to assume greater domestic responsibilities both of which help to perpetuate that
subordination."); Kathryn Branch, Are Women Worth As Much As Men?: Employment
Inequities, Gender Roles, and Public Policy, 1 DurrE J.GENDER L. & PoL'Y 119, 122 (1994)
(discussing how women most often have the responsibility of tending to family problems).
133. Jeremy I. Bohrer, Note, You, Me, and the Consequences of Family: How Federal

Employment Law Prevents the Shattering of the "Glass Ceiling," 50 WASH. U.J. URD. &
CoNTEMp. L. 401, 418 (1996).

134. But see John Stancavage, Family and Medical Leave Act Draws Cheers, Criticism,
TULSA WORLD, Aug. 1, 1993, at G1 (pointing out that highly compensated workers are
unlikely to be terminated because of their importance to the employer).
135. See Olsen, supra note 127, at 1015.
136. See Bohrer, supra note 133, at 417-18.
137. Bohrer, supra note 133, at 418.

138. Olsen, supra note 127, at 1016.
139. Kathy Hensley Trumbull, Congressman's Bill Proves to Couple that System Works,

SUN-SENTNEL, Mar. 24, 1993, at 2B.
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The second effect of the exemption is to discourage men from
taking a more active role in family caretaking. 4 ° Husbands of
working women who fall within the top ten percent of paid employees will choose not to take advantage of their FMLA entitlements
because of the "unwillingness to jeopardize the job security and
economic security of their family." '4 1 Consequently, the wife will
take leave because her restoration is guaranteed while her husband's is not, assuming she is also not a "key employee."142 Not
only does a woman sacrifice job security, but forcing her to take
leave may result in a lost opportunity for career advancement.1 43
"As a result, women remain clustered in inferior positions [and] ...
. become frustrated and opt for different employment, confirm[ing]
the adverse stereotypes that had worked against their advancement
in the first instance." 1" Thus, because the exemption forces women
to take leave if their husbands are paid among the highest ten percent, it does not result in increasing male participation in childbearing, one of the goals of the Act. 45 By forcing women rather than
men to take leave, Congress is indirectly telling women that male
occupation is more important than female occupation and if a conflict arises, the woman should be more concerned with raising the
family and leave her job.'4 6

In addition to negatively impacting women, the "key employee"
provision may also discriminate against older employees. As is the
case in most companies, the highest paid employees are older, more
experienced, and have served their respective companies for many
140. See Olsen, supra note 127, at 1017. S. REP. No. 3, 103d Cong. at 29 (1993).
141. See Olsen, supra note 127, at 1017. See also J.D. Moore Jr., Law Heralds Changes
... For Some Benefits to Affect Half of Workers, KAN'.

Crry STAR, July 21, 1993, at BI

(claiming that many of those in the highest 10% of paid employees will not request leave
"because they tend to be highly motivated executives who probably couldn't stand to be out
of the office for three months").
142. See Olsen, supranote 127, at 1017; see also Rhode, supra note 130 at 1210 (revealing,
based on studies, that "at the highest levels of professional status and financial achievement,
significant disparities [between men and women] have remained").
143. See Olsen, supra note 127, at 1018; Paolo Wright-Carozza, Organic Goods: Legal
Understandingsof Work, Parenthood,and Gender Equality in Cqmparative Perspective, 81
CAL. L. REv.531, 557 (1993).
144. Olsen, supra note 127, at 1018.
145. See supra notes 139-141 and accompanying text.
146. See generally Wright-Carozza, supra note 143, at 555 (suggesting that Congress,
through the FMLA, assumes that women place a higher priority on pregnancy and maternity
rather than their occupation).
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years. 147 Moreover, many employers believe that older employees
are more likely to need medical treatment than their younger counterparts. 48 Based on these two factors, the exemption will most
likely fall disproportionately upon older employees. If high salaried, older employees or their spouses become ill, employers might
be able to use the leave as a pretext to deny reinstatement. As a
result, the exemption may be an invitation to a claim of age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"). 1 49 For example, a disgruntled "key employee" who is
denied restoration and is forty years or older1 50 might contest the
employer's rights under the FMLA, as well as file a claim for age
discrimination under the ADEA. A court may find that the "key
employee's" restoration would in fact cause "substantial and grievous economic injury" and therefore find the employer's denial of
restoration justified. 5 ' Based on this ruling, the question that then
arises is whether this would bar the employee from then claiming
that the employer's justification was merely a pretext for discrimination under the ADEA. The employer will inevitably argue that
the finding of sufficient economic injury is justified as a "reasonable52
factor other than age" to refute the claim of age discrimination.1
147. See Charles B. Craver, The Application of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act to Persons Over Seventy, 58 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 52, 69 ("[Cjompensation levels tend to
be directly related to years of employment .... "). In addition, it is more likely that
employees 40 or older are more highly paid than other employees. See id. at 92.
148. See DLANE ARTHUR, RECRUrriNG, INTERVIEWING, SELECrING & ORIENTING NEw

EmpLOYEES 8 (2d ed. 1991). Consistent with this theory, they also believe that "[p]ension,
health insurance, and life insurance costs increase as the worker ages." Craver, supra note
147, at 55. Despite these stereotypical notions, many have argued that they are inaccurate.
See ARTHUR, at 8. "Older workers ... have fewer avoidable absences than do younger
workers and good attendance records overall ....
Older workers exhibit less stress on the
job, have a lower rate of illegal drug use, and have a lower rate of admission to psychiatric
facilities." Id.

149. For a judicial framework evaluating age discrimination under the ADEA through a
disparate impact or disparate treatment theory, see Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older

Workers, DisparateImpact, and the Age Discriminationin Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. REv.
229 (1990).
150. The ADEA applies only to workers who are 40 and older. See Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90-202, ch. 14, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §631(a) (1995)).
151. Conversely, if a court found that the key employee's restoration would not cause
"substantial and grievous economic injury," the employer's decision to terminate would be
deemed wrongful and the court would not address the issue of alleged age discrimination.
152. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1995). Since the Act expressly endorses the use of
reasonable non-age factors, reliance on a neutral cost criterion would be deemed legitimate
absent evidence of a pretext to target older workers. In terms of policy, the employer might
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However, the courts
are split as to the approach to take in deter3

mining liability.1'

Upon closer examination, there are two other observations that
can be made. First, it appears that "key employees" in their "thirties" are even more disproportionately affected by the exemption
than their "forty-plus" counterparts. For example, a thirty eight
year old's salary may be almost equivalent to a forty-one year old's
salary. Unlike the older employee, the thirty eight year old

employee is not protected under the ADEA. Therefore, the
employee in his or her "thirties" would not have the same recourse

as an employee in his or her "forties." This also supports the notion
that women vill also be disproportionately affected by the exemption because most women who seek FMLA protection based on
maternity leave will be younger
than forty and therefore not pro154
tected under the ADEA.

V. A MoRE

FLEXIBLE STANDARD

As shown above, the "key employee" exemption creates many
difficulties for not only the employer, but the employee as well. If
its purpose is to protect the economic viability of the employer
while at the same time coexisting with family concerns, Congress

argue that the Act cannot be read to demand that a struggling business retain senior workers
regardless of their cost. See Kaminshine, supra note 149, at 256.
153. See Kaminshine, supra note 149, at 257. Under one approach, a showing of severe
economic injury absent pretext would preclude a charge of age bias. See iL at 257 n.132
(citing Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1206-07 (1987)); Mastic v. Great Lakes Steel
Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299, 1318 (1976). A different approach, however, "would focus on the
[seemingly] inevitable correlation between seniority, salary, and age" and possibly find the
exemption "as the functional equivalent of overt age-based treatment." Kaminshine, supra
note 149, at 257 n.133 (citing Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc.; 454 F. Supp. 715,728 (1978)).
A third approach recommended by the author would look at the exemption as "facially
neutral," but require the employer to show that the denial of restoration was necessary and
without pretext. See Kaminshine, supra note 149, at 257 n.134 (citing New York City Transit
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971)). Applying this standard, the outcome would appear to be similar to the first
approach based on the court's showing that the denial of restoration was justified to prevent
"substantial and grievous economic injury."
154. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90-202, ch. 14,81
Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §631(a) (1995)) (applying the ADEA to
those workers who are age 40 or older).
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should consider changing parts of the exemption that contradict
this
155
goal and clarify ambiguities before controversies arise.
One consideration would be to eliminate the "key employee"
exception completely. 156 The effect would be to restore any
employee on leave "to the 'same' or 'equivalent' position, regardless of [one's] rate of compensation."'15 7 While employers may
argue that it will take away some of their leverage when employees
make decisions regarding family leave, 58 the current exception is
written in such a way that it only applies in very limited circumstances. Evidence that the exception is not a necessary part of the
FMLA is its absence in Title II which deals with federal civil service
employees.'5 9 Neither the legislative history nor the statute itself
has explained why it should only apply to the private and state and
local government sectors.160 Further evidence of its unimportance
is that there has not been one case involving the "key employee"
exception since the Act's inception over five years ago.
Another possible solution would be to eliminate the top paid ten
percent distinction of the exemption and simply allow the employer
to exempt an "indispensable" employee, regardless of their salary,
whose absence would either cause serious harm to the employer's
operation or substantial risk to the health and safety of other
employees or the public.' 61 This would provide the employer with
155. See Jeremy I. Bohrer, Note, You, Me, and the Consequencesof Family: How Federal
Employment Law Prevents The Shattering of the "Glass Ceiling," 50 WASH. U. J. URn. &
CoNTEMP. L. 401, 417 (1996).

156. See id. One congressman, Rep. Johnston, has even downplayed the importance of
the exception by describing the clause as "originally put in to pacify opponents of the bill and
...

left in inadvertently, even though the bill had widespread support." See Kathy Hensley

Trumbull, Congressman'sBill Proves to Couple that System Works, SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 24,
1993, at 2B.
157. Amy Olsen, Comment, Family Leave Legislation: Ensuring Both Job Security and

Family Values, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 983, 1024 (1995).
158. There is evidence that many employees abuse FMLA rights in "using [it] to avoid
being fired for absenteeism or taking time off for minor ailments." Thom Weidlich, Leave
Law Still Draws Ire Despite Employer Wins, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 9, 1995, at BI (1995).

159. See Jane Rigler, Analysis and Understandingof the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993, 45 CASE W. REs. L. Rnv. 457, 469 (1995).
160. See id.
161. See Janet Quist, Clinton Signs Family and Medical Leave Act, NATION'S CrrIEs
WKLy., Feb. 8, 1993, at 1, 2 (1993). Some states have actually enacted legislation to eliminate
the top ten percent provision. For example, the Texas Commerce Bank has decided that all
of its employees, even the most highly paid, will be covered by the Act. See L.M. Sixel,
Family Leave Goes Into Effect Today: 60% of Workers Won't Be Covered, Hous.
CHRONICLE, Aug. 5, 1993, available in 1993 WL 9566655. This possibility had previously
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more flexibility, especially in the case of new or mid-size businesses

that may lack financial stability where the loss of an important
employee may greatly impact a company's existence. Unlike the
current exemption, this broader discretion given to employers in
denying reinstatement considers the safety and health of fellow
employees and the public.162

By eliminating the top ten percent provision, women will no
longer be concerned with the potential loss of job security by taking
family leave and it will be "equally economically prudent" for a
husband or wife to take leave.' 63 In addition, the focus of the
exemption will no longer be on older employees. In this way, the

FMLA's goals of balancing job security and family values will be
met.
Rather than rewriting the exemption, Congress may consider
issuing guidelines more narrowly defining "substantial and grievous" economic injury. 1' 4 While it must be evaluated individually,
minimum standards can be established based on industry or company size. 6 5 Applying specific numerical standards would help

ensure compliance under the statute as well as reduce employer disbeen raised by Rep. Goodling. See 139 CONG. REc. H396, 437 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1993)
(statement of Rep. Goodling). Others opposed the proposed amendment fearing "delay and
extensive litigation" because "in every instance, an employer would be able to challenge the
right of an employee to take leave whether the employer worked on an assembly line or as a
secretary." Id. (statement of Rep. Ford). In addition, the employee would have the difficult
task of proving that his or her leave would not harm the employer. See id. (statement of Rep.
Ford). The amendment ultimately failed 185-238. See id.; Quist, supra note 161, at 2.
162. See 139 CONG. Rac. H396, 437 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Goodling). In response to Rep. Goodling's proposal, Rep. Ford argued against eliminating
the top ten percent distinction because "the employer could [then] always challenge the right
to take leave, [and] this amendment would significantly undermine, if not eliminate, the
peace of mind that the legislation was intended to give the employees in the first place"
which was "the security that comes from the knowledge that leave will be available if a family
emergency arises." Id.
163. See Oisen, supra note 157, at 1018.
164. Congress had previously raised the question of possibly creating specified standards
to establish "substantial and grievous economic injury." See Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993; Interim Final Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,794, 31,805 (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.218(a)
(1995)) (proposed June 4, 1993). "Excessively narrow standards could make this exemption
illusory." J.W. Waks & C.R. Brewster, Family Leave Coverage is Overestimated,NAT'L L.J.,
May 3, 1993, at 20 n.8.
165. For example, for companies employing 50 to 100 workers, Congress might require
that the employee in question earn at least a six figure salary to be considered "key" and the
harm incurred must affect company earnings by at least two percent.
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cretion in determining who would qualify and the level of harm
necessary to deny reinstatement.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The current "key employee" exemption to the Family and Medical Leave Act incorporates vague and ambiguous terminology.
Specifically, the requirement that the employer show "substantial
and grievous economic injury" is ambiguous and provides little guidance to employers in making a sufficient determination of harm.
In applying the exemption to the highest paid ten percent of workers, it will generally tend to fall disproportionately on older employees. In particular, it discriminates against female employees by
forcing women to choose between their own job security and the
security of their families. Based on these factors, it is clear that the
exemption is inconsistent with the goals of the Family and Medical
Leave Act. Therefore, the "key employee" exemption should be
eliminated or revised to better suit the goals of the FMLA as well
as the concerns of family households and employers alike.
Neil S. Levinbook
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